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A Market Experiment on Trade Promotion Budget and Allocation 
Abstract 
We design a market experiment to examine how firm size and ability to choose 
trade promotion types influence trade promotion budget, its allocation and channel 
profits. Our experimental results show that larger manufacturers offer smaller trade 
promotion budgets. Manufacturers with ability to influence the allocation decision favor 
scan-backs while retailers favor off-invoices. Trade promotion decisions affect profit 
sharing within the channel but not total channel profit. We validate these findings with an 
econometric analysis of survey data from supermarket executives. Overall, our results 
suggest that market experiments can shed light on trade promotion outcomes for which 
industry data are sparse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trade promotions comprise a growing category of manufacturer incentives directed to 
retailers rather than to end consumers. These promotions are designed to influence retailers’ sales 
and prices by providing various inducements. Manufacturers of consumer-packaged goods 
(CPGs) are increasing their trade promotions worldwide. For example, in the US, CPG 
manufacturers have increased their trade promotions to retailers eight-fold between 1996 and 
2004 (Joyce 2005) and reached a near all-time high (over 80 billion dollars) in 2007. Trade 
promotion spending of U.S. manufacturers accounted for an unprecedented 53 percent of their 
average marketing budget in 2006 (versus 25 percent two decades ago) and was their second 
largest expense after the cost of goods (Cannondale 2007). In Europe, trade promotion budgets 
were over fourteen percent of CPG manufacturers’ gross sales in 2003 and the largest fifty firms 
allocated about €100 billion on trade promotions that year (Lawrie 2004). Moreover, trade 
promotions are also growing in emerging economies, hand in hand with the globalization of 
supply chains (Reardon, Henson and Berdague, 2007).  
In spite of their growth, trade promotions often generate conflict in the distribution 
channel (Ailawadi et al. 2009). Trade promotion budgets impact directly the effective wholesale 
price paid by retailers and profit sharing among members of the distribution channel. Moreover, 
manufacturers and retailers decide on the budget allocation between two broad promotion types: 
discount- and performance-based. A manufacturer may offer a retailer discount-based trade 
promotions, in which a per-case discount is given for all retailer purchases of a given brand 
during a limited period of time (e.g. off-invoices). Or, a manufacturer may negotiate with a 
retailer performance-based trade promotions, in which a discount per case is given after a pre-
specified level of retail sales performance (e.g. target sales volume per week) has been attained 
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and verified by retail sales scanning data (e.g. scan-backs). There are many other trade 
promotion types such as cooperative advertising, market development funds and bill-backs, 
among other, but this study focuses on the two most popular types of scan-backs and off-
invoices. 
The economics and marketing literatures have addressed factors that affect trade 
promotions between manufacturers and retailers. A strain of research primarily from industrial 
organization economics suggests that channel relationships influence the negotiation of trade 
promotions (Cotterill 2001; Sullivan 2002; Scheffman 2002; Hamilton 2003). Likewise, 
marketing researchers develop conceptual and analytical models to understand the links between 
trade promotion decisions and channel performance (Ailawadi, Farris, and Shames 1999; Cui, 
Raju and Zhang 2008; Drèze and Bell 2003); examine the extent of own and cross-category pass 
through (Ailawadi and Harlam 2009; Besanko, Dubé and Gupta 2008; Pauwels 2007); and use 
survey data1 to examine the impact of manufacturer/retailer characteristics on trade promotion 
decisions (Gómez, Rao, and McLaughlin 2007). 
In spite of the recent increase in trade promotion studies data availability is still a 
limitation for marketing researchers. A common problem encountered in the literature is the 
difficulty in obtaining data on trade promotions because they are part of a firm’s marketing 
strategy and because they are inconsistently reported in financial statements by firms (Ailawadi 
et al. 2009; Skibo 2007; Drèze and Bell 2003). Moreover, a recent assessment by Brown and 
Dant (2008) finds that only a small number of retailing studies have employed market 
experiments to distribution channel problems. We believe that experimental economics methods 
can shed light on the consequences of the behavior of a manufacturer and a retailer dyad making 
                                                 
1 These data were collected under unique circumstances, and linked to a retailer scholarship to a nationally 
recognized food executive program. 
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trade promotion budget and allocation decisions. Experimental economics employs laboratory 
methods to the analysis of motivated human decision behavior in contexts governed by specific 
rules (Davis and Holt 1993; Smith 1990). In particular, the experimental economics literature 
applies and encourages the application of heuristic, exploratory methods that provide empirical 
probes to new topics and novel experimental methods (e.g. Smith 2009; Holt and Anderson 
1996). These methods can provide data on manufacturer and retailer trade promotion decisions 
that may be hard to obtain otherwise. 
In this study we design a market experiment that allows us to examine the impact of 
manufacturer-retailer dyad characteristics on trade promotion outcomes (budget and allocation) 
and channel performance. In particular, we focus on three aspects of the manufacturer-retailer 
dyad relationship: 1) manufacturer size (large and small); 2) retailer size (large and small); and 
3) firm’s ability to select the trade promotion type between off-invoices and scan-backs. In our 
experiment, we specify that a larger manufacturer (retailer) has the ability to sell (buy) products 
outside the dyad, but small firms cannot. We employ concepts rooted in the distribution channel 
literature (Bucklin 1973, 1986; El-Ansary and Stern 1973) and develop testable hypotheses. Our 
results suggest that 1) a large manufacturer offers a smaller trade promotion budget (as 
percentage of wholesale price); 2) the allocation to off-invoices (scan-backs) decreases 
(increases) when the manufacturer makes the allocation decision and increases (decreases) when 
the retailer makes the allocation decision; and 3) trade promotion decisions affect profit sharing 
between the manufacturer and the retailer but have no effect on total channel profits. In addition, 
we validate our findings in the market experiment using data from a food retailing survey on 
trade promotions negotiated with their suppliers. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first describe our market experiment 
and state our hypotheses. Next, we describe the implementation of the experimental design and 
discuss our findings from the market experiment. Subsequently, we assess the validity of our 
experimental findings using industry data. In a concluding section we discuss managerial and 
policy implications, and propose topics for future research. 
 
MARKET EXPERIMENT 
Using networked computers, we simulate markets with different characteristics and 
observe how manufacturers and retailers behave in an interactive setting. In our experiment, 
manufacturers earn experimental dollars (EDs) by selling to the retailers while retailers earn EDs 
by selling to the consumers. Manufacturers and retailers make decisions to maximize their ED 
earnings. In our market experiment we assume that a manufacturer selects the budget and, 
subsequently, either the manufacturer or the retailer makes the allocation decision to either off-
invoices or scan-backs. 2 
We experimentally manipulate three factors each at two levels. These are: the size of the 
manufacturer (large or small), the size of the retailer (large or small), and the ability of a channel 
member to influence allocation. A “large” manufacturer produces more units (i.e., commands a 
larger market size) than its “small” counterparts; and this “large” manufacturer also has the 
ability to sell excess production outside the dyad in an external market. Similarly, a “large” 
retailer enjoys a larger potential consumer demand than a “small” retailer and has the ability to 
procure units outside the dyad when consumer demand exceeds the quantity ordered from the 
                                                 
2  This sequence of decisions is supported in our interviews among a convenience sample of retail buyers from 
fifteen supermarket companies. The respondents reported that in 70 percent of the cases, the manufacturer 
determines an annual promotion budget for each retail brand account; next, the retailer and the manufacturer decide 
how promotional funds can best be allocated, depending on their ability to influence decisions in the channel.  
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manufacturer in the dyad. A “small” manufacturer (retailer) cannot sell (buy) outside the dyad. 
These three features are combined to yield six experimental conditions (Table 1). However, we 
could use only six cells of the planned 2x2x2 design because two of the cells became redundant. 
These two cells are the conditions involving a small manufacturer making the allocation decision 
and a small retailer making the allocation decision. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 With the setup of our market experiment, we now discuss specific hypotheses which 
address the links between 1) channel member size (large or small) and trade promotion budget; 
2) channel member size (large or small) and allocation between off-invoices and scan-backs; and 
3) channel member ability to influence the allocation decision and the allocation between off-
invoices and scan-backs. We do not consider the link between ability to influence the allocation 
and trade promotion budget because normally the allocation decision takes place after the 
manufacturer selects its trade promotion budget. This is also consistent with our experimental 
design (See Table 2 for Stages of experiments). 
Size of channel members and trade promotion budget: A stream of research primarily from 
industrial organization economics examines the causes and consequences of trade promotions in 
the context of distribution channel relationships (Cotterill 2001; Sullivan 2002; Scheffman 2002; 
Hamilton 2003). This literature shows that trade promotions may produce demand distortions 
and move prices away from the competitive equilibrium. The most studied causal relationship in 
this stream of literature is how the size of market participants and the corresponding market 
structure affects prices in the channel (Bresnahan 1989). Since trade promotion budgets affect 
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the effective wholesale price, industrial organization theory implies that large manufacturers may 
allocate smaller trade promotion budgets than small manufacturers. Conversely, large retailers 
may receive greater trade promotion budgets because they have the leverage to command a 
higher percentage and lowering the effective price paid to manufacturers.  
The marketing literature also offers evidence of the links between channel member size 
and trade promotion budget. Mela, Gupta and Jedidi (1998) show that the dramatic shift of 
marketing expenditures from direct consumer advertising to trade promotions have increased 
concentration in the retail sector. More recently, Gómez, Rao and McLaughlin (2007) find that 
manufacturer variables such as brand price premium as well as annual retailer sales (or retailer 
size) determine trade promotion budgets. Finally, Cui, Raju and Zhang (2008) develop a game 
theoretical model to show that manufacturers have incentives to price discriminate between large 
and small retailers. These authors show that it is optimal for manufacturers to offer the same list 
price to all retailers, but they can implement price discrimination through trade promotions.  
Therefore, based on both the industrial organization and the marketing literatures, we 
suggest the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Trade promotion budget measured as a percentage of wholesale price is smaller (larger) for 
a large manufacturer (retailer) than that for a small manufacturer (retailer).  
 
Ability to influence the allocation decision and allocation to off-invoices versus scan-backs: The 
economics and marketing literatures have addressed the allocation between performance- and 
discount-based trade promotions in the context of channel relationships. Ailawadi, Farris and 
Shames (1999) demonstrate that performance-based trade promotions linking manufacturer and 
retail prices, such as scan-backs, may enhance the ability of manufacturers to coordinate 
distribution channels by ensuring that trade promotions are reflected in lower retail prices. This 
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is contrary to the impact of off-invoice allowances, which enable retailers to engage in forward 
buying or partial pass-through. Theoretical and empirical work by Bell and Drèze (2002) and 
Drèze and Bell (2003) compare retailer pricing and profitability between off-invoices and scan-
backs. Drèze and Bell (2003) formalize the findings of Ailawadi, Farris and Shames (1999) and 
show theoretically that, ceteris paribus, retailers prefer off-invoices over scan-backs while 
manufacturers prefer scan-backs over off-invoices. Retailers prefer off-invoices because of the 
flexibility offered in their use (e.g., allowing the retailer to forward buy, and even engaging in 
diverting) and the possibility of not having to pass-through all discounts to the consumer. 
However, this greater retailer flexibility comes at a cost to the manufacturers: they lose control 
over their marketing mix. They also argue that manufacturers can design scan-back trade 
promotions that provide the same benefits to retailers as off-invoice promotions. More recently, 
Kurata and Yue (2008) develop a model focusing on scan-backs, and show that manufacturers 
and other members of the supply chain always benefit from scan-backs. In contrast, retailers 
benefit from scan-backs only when they are offered together with buy-backs, in which the 
manufacturer agrees to buy back some or all of the products that are not profitable to the retailer.  
 These results imply that, with ability to influence the allocation decision, a manufacturer 
would prefer scan-backs over off-invoices. Conversely, a retailer with ability to select the trade 
promotion type would choose off-invoices over scan-backs. Therefore, we offer the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H2: The allocation to off-invoices (scan-backs) increases (decreases) with retailer’s ability to 
influence the allocation decision and decreases (increases) with manufacturer’s ability to 
influence the allocation decision. 
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Size of channel members and allocation to off-invoices and scan-backs: Kasulis et al. (1999) 
argue from a theoretical perspective that a large manufacturer should maximize allocation to 
scan-backs. Gómez, Maratou and Just (2006) use supermarket data to provide empirical evidence 
that large retailers can increase the allocation of funds to off-invoice trade promotions by 
achieving higher market share for their private labels, while manufacturers decrease the 
allocation of funds to off-invoice trade promotions by establishing formal policies of negotiation 
and influence the allocation in favor to scan-back types. Gómez, Rao and McLaughlin (2007) 
show that retail companies with larger annual sales, stronger brand positioning, and formal 
policies are able to increase the allocation to off-invoices and to decrease allocation to 
performance-based trade promotions. Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: A large manufacturer (retailer) decreases the allocation to off-invoices (scan-backs). 
 
Profit Implications of Trade Promotion Decisions: Due to the difficulty of collecting trade 
promotion data, there has been little empirical research in the literature about the effects of trade 
promotion decisions on channel profits. Many researchers and practitioners argue that retailers 
increase profits by demanding larger trade promotions from suppliers (Farris and Ailawadi 
1992). Because in our controlled experimental setting trade promotion budget acts as a cost for 
the manufacturer and a benefit for the retailer, we expect the amount of trade promotion budget 
to have a positive effect on manufacturer profit and a negative one on retailer profit. What’s 
more interesting is the impact of alternative trade promotion allocation strategies on profits of 
channel members. Ailawadi, Farris and Shames (1999) use a series of numerical simulations to 
show that performance-based trade promotions such as scan-backs may increase the share of a 
manufacturer’s profits. In the same spirit, Nelsin, Powell and Stone (1995) develop a dynamic 
optimization model of manufacturers, retailers, and consumers. The authors show that allocation 
 11
to types that eliminate forward-buying behavior (e.g. scan-backs) may result in higher 
manufacturer profits. Based on these studies, we hypothesize that: 
H4: A manufacturer (retailer) profits decrease (increase) with trade promotion budget; and a 
manufacturer (retailer) profits decrease when trade promotion budget is allocated to off-invoices 
(scan-backs). 
IMPLIMENTATION OF MARKET EXPERIMENT 
We ran this experiment in two sessions (symmetric versus asymmetric) and for each 
session we recruited forty MBA students with an average work experience of forty three months 
and an average age of thirty. Most of the subjects had previous work experience on issues related 
to relationships in the distribution channels of goods and services. The selection of subjects for 
the study provides face validity to our results. Each subject was paid $10-$15 privately at the end 
of the experiment, depending on performance. In addition, the subject with the highest 
accumulated profit at the end of the experiment received a $200 gift certificate from a netional 
chain of electronic stores. Half of the subjects were randomly assigned to the symmetric 
condition and half to the asymmetric condition. At the beginning of each session, ten subjects 
were randomly assigned as manufacturers and ten as retailers and they remained in the same 
roles throughout the experiment. In about 90 minutes, the subjects traded as manufacturer-
retailer dyads using experimental dollars (EDs) in a series of market periods. A market period 
consists of manufacturers and retailers making decisions in the distribution channel (described in 
detail below) that lead to channel member profits at the end of each period.  
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The experiment was programmed using Z-tree3 and all the transactions were completed 
through networked computers. In each period, the computer system first randomly selects a 
manufacturer (M) and a retailer (R) to form a dyad. In symmetric markets (when manufacturer 
and retailer are both large or both small), five of the ten dyads have large manufacturers selling 
to large retailers and the other five dyads have small manufacturers selling to small retailers. In 
asymmetric markets (when one of the members of the dyad is large and the other small), five of 
the ten dyads have large manufacturers selling to small retailers and the other five dyads have 
small manufacturers selling to large retailers. Then five markets were randomly formed, each 
having two different types of manufacturer-retailer dyads. In other words, each market in 
symmetric channel consists of a M(large)-R(large) pair and a M(small)-R(small) pair whereas 
each market in the asymmetric condition consists of a M(large)-R(small) pair and a M(small)-
R(large) pair. Because there were five markets in a given period, the subjects did not know in 
advance which markets they belonged to and who they were trading with. 
For each market, the computers simulate 100 robot consumers, each potentially 
demanding one unit of a hypothetical product. Each robot consumer has a value for the product 
which represents the reservation price (defined as the highest price this consumer is willing to 
pay). The value for any consumer is a random draw from a uniform distribution between 0 and 
10 EDs. The large manufacturer (retailer) in the market produces (has the potential to sell) 80 
units whereas the small manufacturer (retailer) produces (has the potential to sell) only 20 units.  
At the beginning of the experiment, instructions were read and questions were answered 
publicly, followed by a practice period to familiarize subjects with the experimental 
environment. During the practice period, the experimenter explained information on each screen 
                                                 
3 Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments (Fischbacher 2007). 
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and answered questions as the practice experiment progressed. This procedure ensured that all 
subjects understood the details of the experiment.  
Within each market period there are five stages shown in Table 2. In the first stage, given 
wholesale price PM = 2 EDs and the information about manufacturer and retailer size within the 
dyad, the manufacturer decides on the trade promotion budget (TP %) as a percentage discount 
of PM. In the second stage, retailers decide the number of units to order from the manufacturer 
(QM) knowing the trade promotion budget offered by the manufacturer (TP %). In the third stage 
one of the channel members within a dyad make the allocation decision between off-invoices and 
scan-backs. In the asymmetric markets, only the large manufacturers and large retailers make the 
allocation decisions whereas in the symmetric markets the computers randomly select a member 
within a dyad. If the trade promotion budget is allocated to off-invoices, the units used to 
determine the total amount of trade promotion (QTP) will be the same as the quantity ordered by 
the retailer (QM). However, if the trade promotion budget is allocated to scan-backs, then the 
units considered in trade promotion (QTP) is equal to the quantity sold by retailer to the end 
consumers (QR). Thus, if off-invoices are selected the total amount of trade promotion paid to the 
retailer Boff-invoices = TP% * PM * QM (and Bscanbacks = 0). If scan-backs are chosen, then the trade 
promotion allowance Bscanbakcs = TP% * PM * QR (and Boff-invoices = 0). In the fourth stage, given 
the trade promotion allowance and type selected, retailers make decisions on the retail price (PR) 
as a value between 0 and the maximum consumer value 10EDs. In the fifth stage, transactions 
were completed by computer-simulated robot buyers. If a consumer’s value is higher than or 
equal to the retail price, he/she will purchase one unit of the product from the retailer. Otherwise, 
the consumer will not purchase. For the unsold units (QM - QR), there is a per inventory cost of I 
= 0.10EDs for the retailer.  
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
Subjects were informed of the transaction outcomes (including units sold, inventory left, 
the amount and type of trade promotion and profits) in the current period before they moved on 
to the next period. Manufacturer’s profits depend on (1) revenue; (2) trade promotion budget and 
its allocation; and (3) its ability to sell excess production elsewhere. A small manufacturer 
cannot sell its excess production outside the dyad whereas a large manufacturer can sell its 
excess production elsewhere with a profit margin that is 50% of the profit margin it gets by 
selling the product to the retailer in the dyad4. Therefore, profits for small manufacturers in 
period t were calculated as: 
 
(1)  )**%()*( ,,,,,_ tMtTPtMtMtermanufactursmall PQTPPQPROFIT −= , 
 
where the first term in parenthesis is manufacturer revenues and the second is trade promotion. 
Likewise, the profits for large manufacturers in period t are: 
 
(2)  ]*5.0*))80[()**%()*( ,,,,,,,_arg tMtMtMtTPtMtMtermanufacturel PQPQTPPQPROFIT −+−= , 
 
where the first two terms are the same as in equation (1) and the third term in parenthesis 
represents manufacturer profits accruing to units sold outside the dyad. 
Retailer profits depend on (1) revenue; (2) trade promotion budget and its allocation; (3) 
inventory costs for unsold units; and (4) its ability to procure shortages from elsewhere. 
                                                 
4 In order for the subjects to focus on within-dyad trade promotion decisions, we made sure that profit margin 
outside the dyad was lower (50% here) than the profit margin within the dyad. 
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A small retailer cannot procure units from elsewhere outside the dyad. Therefore, the quantity 
sold to consumers (QR) cannot exceed the quantity ordered from the manufacturer (QM). If 
consumer demand exceeds the units ordered from the manufacturer in the dyad (QR > QM), a 
large retailer procures the shortage (Qoutside) from elsewhere with a profit margin that is 50% of 
the profit margin it gets by selling the units ordered from the manufacturer in the dyad. 
Therefore, profits for small retailers in period t are: 
 
(3) ]*)[()**%()*()*( ,,,,,,,,,_ ttRtMtMtTPttMtMtRtRtretailersmall IQQPQTPPQPQPROFIT −++−= , 
 
where the first term is retailer revenues; the second term is the cost of goods sold; the third term 
is the trade promotion income; and the fourth term is the inventory cost corresponding to unsold 
units (when QM>QR). Analogously, the profits for a large retailer in period t are: 
 
(4) 
]*5.0*)[(
]*)[()**%()*()*(
,,,
,,,,,,,,,_arg
toutsidetMtR
ttRtMtMtTPttMtMtRtRtretailerel
QPP
IQQPQTPPQPQPROFIT
−+
−++−=
. 
 
In equation (4), the first four expressions in brackets are the same as in equation (3) and 
the fifth term represents the profits accrued to units procured outside the dyad. Total profits for 
manufacturers and retailers were accumulated throughout the periods. The experimental profits 
in EDs accumulated throughout the periods were then converted into real dollars.  
 
STATISTICAL PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES 
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 On average, subjects played thirty six periods in each ninety-minute session. Our unit of 
observation is the manufacturer-retailer dyad. We employ three dichotomous variables to 
measure size in a given retailer manufacturer dyad: LARGE_Mi,t  equals 1 if the manufacturer i in 
period t in the dyad is large, zero otherwise; LARGE_Rj,t equals 1 if the retailer j in period t in the 
dyad is large, zero otherwise; and an interaction term LARGE_DYADi,j,t, which equals 
LARGE_Mi,t times LARGE_Rj,t. We also create a dummy variable M_DECIDESt to account for 
the ability of manufacturers and retailers to select the trade promotion types; this variable is 
equal to one if the manufacturer makes the allocation decision in the dyad in period t, zero 
otherwise.  
 We test the first three hypotheses by creating two dependent variables: (i) the trade 
promotion budget offered by manufacturer i to retailer j in period t (TP_BUDGETi,j,t), expressed 
as a percent of experimental dollars allocated to the wholesale price and (ii) a dummy variable 
for allocation type (OFFINVOICESi,j,t), which equals one if the budget offered by manufacturer i 
to retailer j in period t is allocated to off-invoices and zero otherwise. We estimated the 
following models to test Hypotheses 1-3:  
 
Model 1: TP_BUDGETi,j,t = F1 (LARGE_Mi,t , LARGE_Rj,t , LARGE_DYADi,j,t)to test the 
hypothesis H1 on channel member size and trade promotion budget 
 
Model 2: OFFINVOICESi,j,t  = F2 (LARGE_Mi,t , LARGE_Rj,t , LARGE_DYADi,j,t, 
M_DECIDESt )to test H2 andH3 on the allocation to off-invoices. 
 
 We employ fractional logit (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) and maximum-likelihood 
estimation methods using the logistic distribution as the link function to estimate Model 1 
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because TP_BUDGETi,j,t varies from 0 to 1 (given our data collection procedure). This approach 
employs Generalized Linear Models with the Bernoulli log-likelihood function defined as 
 
(5)                        li(b) = yi log [ G(xib) ] + (1-yi) log [ 1 - G(xib) ], 
 
where G(.) is the logistic function G(xib) = 1/[1+exp(-xib)], yi is the fractional variable, xi is a 
vector of exogenous variables, and b is the vector of parameters to be estimated.  
We employ a standard Logit model for estimating Model 2 because the dependent variable 
OFFINVOICESi,j,t is dichotomous.  
 To investigate the profit implications of trade promotion decisions, we use manufacturer 
and retailer profit measures in period t from equations (1)-(4) depending on the size of the 
channel member. In addition, channel profits in period t are defined as the sum of manufacturer 
and retailer profits in period t. We employed single-equation Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
using the White correction for heteroskedasticity.  
 
RESULTS 
 Our analysis sample comprises 380 observations. The mean percent trade promotion 
budget was 19.8 percent; subjects selected off-invoices on 46.0 percent of the times; and the 
mean unit retailer margin was 3.4. In Table 3 we present results corresponding to each of the 
three main hypotheses.  
Trade promotion budget - Columns 1 and 2 address the impact of manufacturer and 
retailer size on trade promotion percent budget. Our results provide evidence that a large 
manufacturer allocates a smaller percent trade promotion budget than a small manufacturer (five 
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percent level of significance) and a large retailer receives a larger percent trade promotion budget 
than a small retailer (ten percent level of significance). The coefficients in Table 3 are obtained 
from nonlinear models because they do not represent marginal effects of the focal relationships 
and they must be computed.5 The marginal effect indicates that a large manufacturer has a 
percent trade promotion budget that is 3.2 percent points smaller than a small manufacturer. On 
the other hand, a large retailer receives a percent trade promotion budget that is 1.8 percent 
points larger than a small retailer. These results support hypothesis H1. The coefficient of 
LARGE_DYAD suggests that there is no difference in the percent trade promotion budget 
between large manufacturer – large retailer and small manufacturer – small retailer dyads; this 
indicates that there is no interaction between sizes of manufacturer and retailer. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
  Allocation of trade promotions - In Columns 3 and 4, we present maximum likelihood 
estimates and their corresponding odd ratios for the coefficients of the measures of channel 
member size and ability to make the allocation decision to test hypotheses H2 and H3.The 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic is significant, which suggests that the model explains the 
variability of the allocation to off-invoices. The coefficient for M_DECIDES is negative and 
significant, indicating that when a manufacturer makes the allocation decision, it tends to select 
scan-backs relative to off-invoices. In terms of relative probabilities, the odds ratio of choosing 
scan-backs is nearly twice that when the manufacturer makes the decision in the dyad. 
Conversely, retailers with ability to decide on the allocation tend to prefer off-invoices and 
reflect these preferences in their choices. These results provide support to H2.  
                                                 
5  The marginal effect of a given explanatory variable x on  E(y / X) is given by xyE ∂∂ /)|( X , or, for 
specification (3), g(Xβ) βx, where y is the dependent variable, X is the vector of explanatory variables, β is the vector 
of parameters, βx is the coefficient corresponding to variable x, g(z) ≡ dG(z)/dz =  exp(z)/[1+exp(z)]2.  
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 The estimated coefficients of manufacturer and retailer size exhibit the expected signs 
(i.e. a large manufacturer has higher allocation to scan-backs and a large retailer has higher 
allocation to off-invoices) but are statistically insignificant. Therefore, our results do not provide 
qualified support to H3. 
Further, we assessed the internal validity of our results by predicting the trade promotion 
budget and the allocation to off-invoices for the last two periods using estimates obtained for the 
previous periods. The root mean square forecast error (RMSE) and the mean absolute forecast 
error (MAE) for the trade promotion budget are respectively 0.06 and 0.08. Likewise, for the 
allocation to off-invoices equation the model predicted correctly 71 percent of the time. These 
results provide high predictive validity for our model. It is gratifying to see that our subject pool 
is appropriate for this experiment. 
Profit Implications - The results shown in Table 4 suggest that trade promotion decisions 
have important implications for profit sharing in the distribution channel. Manufacturer profits 
tend to decrease with trade promotion budget: a one percent point increase in trade promotion 
budget is associated with a lower manufacturer profit of 0.23 EDs. The implications of trade 
promotion budget decisions for retailers are the opposite: a one percent point increase in trade 
promotion budget is associated with a higher retailer profit of 0.26 EDs. We also find that 
manufacturer-retailer dyads that allocate the budget to off-invoices exhibit manufacturer profits 
that are 2.99 EDs lower than dyads that allocate the budget to scan-backs whereas retailer profits 
are 6.87 EDs higher when the budget is allocated to off-invoices than to scan-backs. These 
findings support H4. Interestingly, we find that channel profits are not affected by the trade 
promotion budget nor by the specific type of trade promotion employed (both TP_BUDGET and 
OFFINVOICES are statistically insignificant in Column 3 of Table 4). Therefore, our results 
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suggest that the net effect of trade promotion budget and its allocation is transfer of profits 
between the retailer and the manufacturer, without altering total channel profits: retailers 
(manufacturers) tend to increase their share of profits with larger (smaller) trade promotion 
budgets and with allocation to off-invoices (scan-backs). This may explain why it is very hard to 
employ trade promotions for channel coordination.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
FURTHER SUPPORT USING SURVEY DATA 
 In this section, we provide additional support to our experimental results using survey 
data on trade promotions from 36 supermarket companies. These data are based a survey 
conducted by Gómez, Rao and McLaughlin (2007) and supplemented with data from secondary 
sources akin to our experimental measures. This analysis is based on 174 usable observations 
covering five product categories and over thirty brands. The unit of observation is a particular 
brand and not the individual trade promotion contract. The dataset contains information on the 
total amount of trade promotion dollars received from manufacturers and the percent allocation 
of these funds to off-invoices and to performance-based types. We supplemented the survey with 
secondary data to measure channel member size and ability to select the trade promotion type, so 
that these data are comparable to those from the market experiment. Specifically, to measure size 
of channel members we collected data on brand market share in the national market (M_SHARE) 
and data on supermarket market share in the main metropolitan areas in which they operate 
(R_SHARE). To measure ability to select the trade promotion type, we employ the following 
question from the survey: “what percent of the times do you select the trade promotion type” 
(R_SELECTS).                            
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 The dependent variables are the percent trade promotion budget and its percent allocation 
to off-invoices. Note that the allocation equation here is a continuous-censored while in the 
market experiment the allocation variable is dichotomous (the budget is all allocated to either 
scan-backs or off-invoices). The vectors of explanatory variables include measures of firm size 
and ability to influence allocation constructs described above and Zj is vector of other control 
variables, including product category dummies and price differences across brands in the same 
product category. We estimate each equation separately to be consistent with the sequence 
followed in the market experiment. Given that the dependent variables vary from zero to one, we 
employ maximum-likelihood estimation methods using the logistic distribution as the link 
function, following the fractional logit model (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996).  
 Table 5 shows all parameter estimates and standard errors for the parameter estimates for 
the budget and allocation equations. Consider the trade promotion budget equation first. The 
estimated coefficient for the manufacturer’s brand market share is negative and significant at the 
one percent level. The marginal effect indicates that a manufacturer with a brand market share 
ten percent points above the sample mean has a percent trade promotion budget five percent 
points smaller. In addition, the estimated coefficient for the market share of the retailer is 
positive and significant at ten percent level. The marginal effect suggests that a retailer with 
market share ten percent points above the sample mean has a percent trade promotion budget two 
percent points larger. These results provide support for H1 and are consistent with the findings in 
the experimental design. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 Regarding the allocation of trade promotion budget, Table 5 shows that increased retailer 
ability to select the trade promotion type (R_SELECTS) is positively related to the allocation of 
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trade promotion budget to off-invoices at the ten percent significance level. The marginal effect 
indicates that retailers that are able to select the trade promotion type ten percent above the 
sample mean can increase allocation to off-invoices by two percent. Conversely, manufacturers 
with increased ability to select the trade promotion type tend to reduce allocation to off-invoices. 
This result provides support to H2. The coefficient of corresponding to the market share of the 
retailer is positive and significant at the one percent level and the marginal effect indicates that a 
retailer with a market share ten percent above the sample mean exhibits an allocation to off-
invoices that is nine percent higher. The coefficient of the manufacturer’s brand market share is 
negative but insignificant. These results provide moderate support for H3. 6  
 Overall, the survey data analysis provides further evidence supporting our major results 
regarding trade promotion decisions. It not only serves as a validation for our market 
experiments but also highlights the need for experimental approach when industry data are hard 
to obtain. 
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this paper, we report the results from a market experiment designed to study the 
influence of manufacturer size, retailer size and channel member’s ability to influence the trade 
promotion type, on trade promotion decisions made by manufacturers and retailers and their 
implications for profit sharing in the distribution channel. Overall, we are able to find support for 
three of our four hypotheses and validate our market experiment with survey data. 
Our results indicate that large manufacturers with ability to sell outside the dyad tend to 
have smaller trade promotion budgets and to increase allocation to scan-backs, relative to their 
small counterparts. In contrast, large retailers with ability to buy outside the dyad tend to receive 
                                                 
6 We are not able to test H4 using the survey data because we do not have profit information.  
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bigger trade promotion budgets and are able to increase allocation to off-invoices than smaller 
retailers. These trade promotion decisions also have profit implications such that manufacturers 
benefit more from scan-backs whereas retailers benefit more from off-invoices. 
Another interesting finding from our study is that trade promotion decisions affect profit 
sharing between manufacturers and retailers but not total channel profit. This suggests that trade 
promotions will continue to be a contentious issue between manufacturers and retailers due to 
their different objectives. Trade promotion outcomes are influenced by such dyad characteristics 
as size of the channel members and ability to influence allocation decisions. These findings are 
valuable to practitioners and public policy makers. 
In addition to the empirical results, the experimental approach allows us to examine the 
effects of key variables in a context-free environment; the experimental economics methods are 
particularly valuable in situations where data are not available. This is the case with the problem 
of trade promotions because they are not systematically reported by firms in certain industries 
and countries. We believe this paper provided evidence to show that market experiments may be 
a useful approach to examine trade promotion decisions in the supply chain, taking into account 
that companies are often reluctant to share data on their trade promotion practices. We hope that 
our approach will be adopted by other researchers on this important managerial problem, where 
data are sparse.  
Future research should be conducted to show the robustness of experimental results by using 
different sets of parameter values. While our market experiment was limited to examining the 
effects of only two characteristics of the channel relationship, the approach can be extended to 
study relationships between trade promotion and other important channel characteristics such as 
brand, access to market intelligence as well as institutional and legal contexts. Further, we did 
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not allow negotiations between manufacturers and retailers when trade promotion budget and 
allocation decisions were made in order to simplify the experimental procedures and to 
manipulate channel relationships. Future research can examine further how retailers and 
manufacturers behave during the negotiation process. Finally, we hope that our experimental 
research will inspire other researchers in examining optimal strategies for manufacturers and 
retailers in a game-theoretic analysis. 
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Table 1: Experimental Conditions 
 
Experimental 
Conditionsa 
 
Dyad Type  
(Large or Small) 
Who makes the Trade 
Promotion Allocation 
Decision 
Manufac-
turer 
Retailer 
 
1 
 
Large 
 
Large 
 
Manufacturer  
 
 
2 
 
 
Large 
 
Large 
 
Retailer 
 
3 
 
Small 
 
Small 
 
Manufacturer  
 
 
4 
 
 
Small 
 
Small 
 
Retailer 
 
5 
 
Large 
 
Small 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
6 
 
Small 
 
Large 
 
Retailer 
 
 
a A “large” manufacturer (retailer) has a large market size and has the ability to sell its products to an alternative 
buyer (from an alternative supplier) outside the dyad; a “small” manufacturer (retailer) has a small market share and 
cannot sell (buy) its products to (from) alternative channel members.  
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Table 2: Stages of Market Experiment within each Market Period 
 
Stage 
 
Description 
 
I 
 
Given wholesale price PM = 2 EDs and the information about manufacturer and 
retailer size within the dyad, the manufacturer selects trade promotion budget 
(TP %) as a percentage discount of PM. 
 
II 
 
The retailer observes the trade promotion budget (TP %) set by the 
manufacturer in the dyad and decides the number of units to order from the 
manufacturer (QM) knowing the trade promotion budget offered by the 
manufacturer. 
 
III 
 
The computer program assigns the allocation decision between off-invoices 
and scan-backs to either the manufacturer or the retailer. In the asymmetric 
markets, only the large manufacturers and large retailers make the allocation 
decisions whereas in the symmetric markets the computers randomly select a 
member within a dyad. 
 
If the budget is allocated to off-invoices, the units used to determine the total 
amount of trade promotion (QTP) will be the same as the quantity ordered by 
the retailer (QM).  
 
If the budget is allocated to scan-backs, then the units considered in trade 
promotion (QTP) is equal to the quantity sold by retailer (QR). 
 
IV 
 
The retailer selects retailer price (PR) as a value between 0 and the maximum 
consumer value 10EDs after observing the trade promotion allowance and the 
allocation type (off-invoices and scan-backs)  
 
V 
 
Transactions were completed by computer-simulated robot buyers. Consumers 
buy one unit of product from the retailer if her value is greater than or equal to 
the retail price; otherwise, the consumer will not purchase. For unsold units 
(QM - QR), there is a per inventory cost of I = 0.10EDs for the retailer. 
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates of Market Experimenta 
 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Dependent Variable: TP_BUDGET OFFINVOICES 
Estimation Method: Fractional Logit Logit 
 
Experimental Conditions 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Odds Ratio 
 
LARGE_M 
 
-0.195**   
(0.095) 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.174     
(0.295)     
 
0.840 
 
LARGE_R 
 
0.154* 
(0.089) 
 
0.018 
 
0.196    
(0.294)      
1.217    
 
LARGE_DYAD 
 
-0.014   
(0.133) 
 
0.005 
 
-0.214   
 (0.417)     
0.806    
 
M_DECIDES 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-0.582***   
(0.211)     
 
0.558    
 
Constant 
 
-1.282**   
(0.066) 
 
-- 
 
0.206    
(0.244)      
 
-- 
 
Number of Observations 
 
380 
 
-- 
 
380 
 
-- 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.07 -- 0.05 -- 
Log Likelihood   -138.9 -- -257.1 -- 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic   -- -- 21.62** -- 
 
Hypothesis Tested 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 
a Standard errors in parenthesis; *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4: Trade Promotion Decisions and Profit Implications 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Manufacturer 
Profits 
 
Retailer  
Profits 
 
Channel  
Profits 
 
TP_BUDGET 
 
-23.59*** 
(5.29) 
 
26.03** 
(11.09) 
 
2.43 
(11.01) 
 
OFFINVOICES 
 
-2.99*** 
(0.97) 
 
6.87*** 
(2.36) 
 
3.88 
(3.31) 
 
LARGE_M 
 
70.34*** 
(0.89) 
 
-6.99*** 
(1.65) 
 
63.35*** 
(1.27) 
 
LARGE_R 
 
9.73*** 
(1.31) 
 
49.54*** 
(2.96) 
 
59.27*** 
(3.46) 
 
LARGE_DYAD 
 
10.19*** 
(1.91) 
 
36.19*** 
(4.73) 
 
46.38*** 
(4.60) 
 
M_DECIDES 
 
-0.68 
(1.00) 
 
-0.15 
(2.42) 
 
-0.84 
(2.32) 
 
Constant 
 
26.04*** 
(1.67) 
 
18.40*** 
(3.30) 
 
44.44*** 
(3.09) 
 
Number of Observations 
 
380 
 
380 
 
380 
 
R-Squared 
 
0.95 
 
0.71 
 
0.88 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates from Industry Survey Data: Determinants of Trade 
Promotion Budget and its Allocation 
 
Dependent Variable: Budget Allocation to  
Off-Invoices 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
 
 
Manufacturer Brand Market 
Share  (M_SHARE) 
 
-0.021*** 
(0.006)a     
 
-0.005 
 
-0.019   
(0.012)     
 
-0.004 
 
Retailer Market Share  
(M_SHARE) 
 
0.009*   
(0.005)     
 
0.002 
 
0.044***   
(0.015)      
 
0.009 
 
Retailer ability to select the trade 
promotion type (R_SELECTS) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
0.910*   
(0.509)      
 
0.002 
 
Intercept 
 
 
-1.864***   
(0.197)     
 
-- 
 
-2.470***   
(0.684)     
 
-- 
 
Control Variables  
    
   Price Differences -2.61***   
(0.682)     
-- -0.749   
(1.435)     
-- 
   Coffee 0.779***   
(0.244)     
-- 0.612   
(0.520)      
-- 
   Ready-to-Eat Cereal 0.867***   
(0.198)     
-- 0.978**   
(0.535)      
-- 
   Laundry Detergent 0.154    
(0.204)     
-- 0.400   
(0.493)      
-- 
   Frozen Dinners 0.253   
(0.195)     
-- 0.814   
(0.496)      
-- 
Number of Observations 172 -- 172 -- 
Log Likelihood  -51.04 -- -78.82 -- 
Pseudo R-squared 0.19 -- 0.36 -- 
a Robust Standard Errors;  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level. 
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